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Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to examine empirically the impact of gender diversity on corporate performance
by both comparing different positions occupied by female directors on the boards and their personal-specific
characteristics.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper examines a sample of Italian listed companies during
2006–2015. To deal with endogeneity issues, the authors use a generalizedmethod of moments as an empirical
methodology.
Findings – The empirical findings show that the positive effect of both independent and executive women
directors on firm performance is moderated by the specific characteristics of female directors. Specifically, the
analyses show that foreign and busy females negatively impact on performance. Conversely, graduate female
directors strengthen the positive link between executive women and firm performance.
Originality/value – The paper sheds light on the consequences of appointing different types of female
directors (i.e. independent, executive, graduate, foreign and busy) on firm performance. Our empirical
research that investigates the association between gender diversity and performance in the Italian context
based on a longitudinal study, which involves a period of ten years, allowing consideration both of the
years before and after the introduction of the gender quota law (Golfo–Mosca law).
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1. Introduction
The topic of gender diversity on the board of directors and in top management is gaining the
attention of both academic scholars and policymakers all over the world (Cambrea et al.,
2018; Willows and van der Linde, 2016; Zhao and Lord, 2016). Because of the legislation that
requires a minimum percentage of women directors [1] on the board of listed and owned-
state companies (Bianco et al., 2015), many studies have investigated whether gender
diversity can enhance board effectiveness (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), can improve firm
performance (Dezsö and Ross, 2012; Lückerath-Rovers, 2013; Post and Byron, 2015) and
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make different corporate decisions, such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives
(Byron and Post, 2016; Rao and Tilt, 2020), risk financial policies (Bernile et al., 2018; Faccio
et al., 2016) and liquidity stock (Atif et al., 2019). However, the evidence is not limited to
explore the role of gender diversity in private companies but also aims to shed light on the
gender effect within the organizations, such as the universities (Siboni et al., 2016). Recently,
Galizzi and Siboni (2016) investigate “whether” and “how” Italian state universities are
promoters of gender equality and find that insufficient attention has been paid to strategies
designed to create gender awareness in science or to support women leadership. Also,
Baldarelli et al. (2016) look at the gender of authors in journals and the academic boards of
academic accounting associations in Italy and observe a clear predominance of men in
covering senior academic positions. Mazzotta et al. (2020) evaluate whether the gender
composition of the board of directors affects strategic plans of Italian universities and
disclose that the university strategic plan is a more gender-sensitive approach when the
board of directors is heterogeneous.
The previous literature examining the impact of women directors on firm
performance generally focuses on the percentage of women on the board and the critical
mass effect (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Gyapong et al., 2016; Joecks et al., 2013;
Rossi et al., 2017). While there is considerable evidence that investigates the role of
women directors (i.e. independent or executive) affecting dividend payouts (Chen et al.,
2017), earnings management practice (García Lara et al., 2017) and cash holdings
policies (Cambrea et al., 2019), empirical studies that examine how different types of
women directors can affect corporate performance are scarce. An exception is a paper of
Liu et al. (2014), which analyses whether the effect of women directors on the
performance of a sample of Chinese listed companies may change according to their
role on the board. However, their findings are restricted to the Chinese institutional
context and, therefore, are not generalizable to companies that operate in a different
business environment.
Over the past years, much research has aimed to examine gender diversity topics in
different countries (Aggarwal et al., 2019). However, few empirical studies on the
relationship between women directors and performance have been conducted in the
Italian context. Martín-Ugedo et al. (2018), who examine a sample of listed companies in
Italy over the period 2005–2011, show a negative effect of female directors’ percentage
on corporate performance. Also, Gordini and Rancati (2017) study the gender diversity–
firm financial performance relationship in an unbalanced panel of 918 Italian listed
companies during the years 2011–2014 and conclude that increasing the female
representation on boards has a positive effect on Tobin’s Q. Rossi et al. (2017) scrutinize
41 Italian listed companies during the period 2005–2013 and display the existence of a
strong ability of women directors to affect corporate performance only when they are at
least three on the board. These empirical studies are limited to investigate the effect of
women directors on firm performance either the years before or the subsequent years
after the introduction of the gender quota law (Golfo–Mosca law), thus not enabling to
seize the law benefits, expressed in terms of increased participation of women on the
boards. Besides, evidence on the Italian context primarily focuses on the impact of the
percentage of female directors, leaving out from the analyses the different roles that
women directors may fulfill on the boards.
Our paper bridges these gaps by disentangling the effect of the different types of women
directors. The empirical research examines a sample of 193 Italian listed companies over the
years 2006–2015. The period considered is new in Italian studies because it allows us to
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evaluate both the years before and after the introduction of the gender quota law
(Golfo–Mosca law).
Italian corporate governance structures are characterized by a higher proportion of
women independent directors and a lower level of executive females (Bianco et al., 2015;
Cambrea et al., 2019). Consequently, we expect that women directors influence with a
different intensity the corporate performance, according to the role they fulfill on the board
of directors. Also, the Italian government has extended the law 120/2011 on gender quotas,
which would have expired within the three years 2020–2022. The new version of the Golfo–
Mosca law has increased to 40% the minimum percentage of women directors to sit on the
boards of Italian listed companies and state-owned enterprises. Therefore, the Italian
context seems appropriate to investigate what effect prevails on the board: the monitoring
role, provided by independent directors, or the executive role.
The empirical findings, referring to a sample of 1,176 observations, show that women
directors, in both independent and executive roles, can positively affect firm performance, even
if with a different intensity. Specifically, the results reveal that women executive directors have
a stronger positive effect on firm performance than women independent directors.
Nevertheless, in additional analyses, we explore the moderating role of some demographic
features of the women directors, such as the educational background, nationality and the
number of other directorships. Interestingly, the results show that the positive effect of women
independent and executive directors become negative when women are foreign and have more
than two offices in other companies. Diversely, the positive impact of executive women
directors is more pronounced when the women directors hold a degree.
Our contribution to the existing literature is threefold. First, the paper enriches the
literature that investigates whether and how females affect corporate performance (Rossi
et al., 2017; Gordini and Rancati, 2017). While the prior literature suggests that larger
participation of women directors in the boards can lead to either better or worse corporate
performance (Post and Byron, 2015), the subsequent attempts to decompose the effect of
female directors into the executive effect and the monitoring effect remain unknown (Liu
et al., 2014). Our study fills this gap by distinguishing both the different roles of women on
the board and the moderating role of specific characteristics of the women directors in
determining the performance of Italian listed companies. Whereas previous studies focus
solely on women directors’ ratio, we also exploit the importance of several specific
characteristics, such as education, nationality and other directorships. Second, our paper is
the first empirical research on a large sample of Italian companies, to the best of our
knowledge, that examines a long period of ten years, allowing us to capture both the years
before and after the introduction of the gender quota law (Golfo-Mosca law). Indeed, recent
empirical studies analyze the characteristics of female directorship in Italy, but they look at:
a restricted sample of companies (Rossi et al., 2017), a short period of analysis (Gordini and
Rancati, 2017) and years before the introduction of the quota law (Martín-Ugedo et al., 2018).
Considering that, on average, the board of directors of companies remain in office for three years,
by using a long period of analysis allows us to take into account a real change in the composition
of women directors on the boards that would not have been possible if the period under
investigation was shorter. Finally, our results clarify the need to use a multi-theoretical approach
in scrutinizing gender diversity. Our paper highlights that referring to a single theory is not
enough to investigate how gender diversity may affect board functioning. Diversely, analyzing
women directors’ role from several different perspectives allows catching unobserved aspects of
female directors that could unveil their contribution to the company board.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a literature
review and introduces the hypothesis development; Section 3 explains the sample selection
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procedure and describes the methodology; whereas Section 4 describes the data, the
empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 5 and 6; finally, Section 7 presents
the concluding remarks.
2. Background
2.1 Theoretical literature review
Legislative initiatives aimed to increase the number of female directors on the boards led
researchers to investigate whether engaging a larger percentage of female directors has
determined a positive or negative impact on the financial performance of companies. As a
result, evidence on gender diversity is growing rapidly, helping to foster the interesting
debate between academics and policymakers (Kang et al., 2010). Despite the large number of
studies, the empirical studies show conflicting results. On the one hand, corporate
governance scholars find a positive effect of female directors on business performance
(Conyon and He, 2017; Erhardt et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2014; Terjesen et al., 2016); on the other
hand, some studies highlight a negative effect (Abdullah, 2014; Adams and Ferreira, 2009;
Ahern and Dittmar, 2012), underlining the disadvantages associated with the presence of
female directors in the boardroom. Also, some empirical research does not detect a
significant link between women and performance (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013; Marinova et al.,
2016; Rose, 2007; Rubino et al., 2017).
Following the existing literature (Aggarwal et al., 2019; Al-Dajani et al., 2014; Jurkus
et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2014; Saeed and Sameer, 2017), to investigate the role of gender diverse
boards, our study uses the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and resource
dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
According to the agency theory perspective, one of the main tasks of the board of
directors is to monitor and discipline the top management team. For this purpose, the
diversity of the board could be a useful tool to use to minimize potential agency problems
(Erhardt et al., 2003). Indeed, it seems that women impact similarly to the independent
directors (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Women directors appear to monitor the activity of the
top management more severely, to have greater involvement than the directors do in
decision-making and to have better conformity with the interests of shareholders (Carter
et al., 2003). Women directors were generally excluded from the old boys’ club (Bianco et al.,
2015). Consequently, their participation on the board of directors can improve the board’s
independence and the monitoring functions (Rhode and Packel, 2014). Also, increasing the
percentage of women directors makes a board more heterogeneous (Carter et al., 2003). In
turn, this relation leads to a more robust monitor of executive members, as diversity brings
different viewpoints to board oversight (Anderson et al., 2011). According to the agency
theory lens, independent female directors may also contribute to better monitoring function
because their reputation may be damaged when they are not good directors.
With regard to the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), board members
represent resources for all businesses and work to create value for all shareholders. From this
perspective, female directors are considered particularly valuable for improving the management
of a company. They have different personal and relational skills compared tomale directors, which
allow them to have a heterogeneous and comprehensive board. In addition, as suggested by Huse
and Solberg (2006), female directors appear to be better prepared than their male counterparts and
seem to be very interactive, which makes them less dependent on management. Hillman et al.
(2002) describe the benefits that women can bring to the board room and highlight that the
majority of women directors come from nonbusiness positions and, hence, they are skilled in a
variety of areas, such as marketing, public relations and law. Moreover, they have excellent ability
to make alliances with themost influential actors (Huse and Solberg, 2006), have better capacity to
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relate to the external environment and to join their second board faster than the male directors
(Hillman et al., 2002). Female directors tend to invest more in research and development (R&D) by
promoting business innovation and send positive business signals to the public regarding the
ethical behavior of the company (Terjesen et al., 2016).
2.2 Empirical literature review and hypotheses development
Conyon and He (2017) analyze the link between firm performance and gender diversity on a
sample of US firms and, differently from other studies, they use a quantile regression
methods. The empirical findings show that women have a positive effect on firm
performance. However, the gender positive effect is not uniform, but it varies across the firm
distribution. The authors show that female directors are able to better impact on
conditionally high-performance firms compared to low-performance firms. Also, Low et al.
(2015), who examine a sample of Asian firms, confirm the existence of benefits in appointing
female directors on the boards. Nonetheless, the positive effect tends to disappear in
countries that force the engaging of female directors trough the observance of a gender
quota. Duppati et al. (2020) explore whether gender diversity affects firm performance in
Singapore and India, which are two countries that have decided to handle gender questions
in two different ways. While India obliges companies to include a mandatory percentage of
women directors on their boards, Singapore adopts a soft law approach. The empirical
findings do not highlight some differences from the observation of a mandatory requirement
and show that increasing the ratio of female on boards improves companies’ performance of
both countries. Willows and van der Linde (2016) assess the board composition of the
Johannesburg Securities Exchange top 40 companies and show the existence of conflicting
results on the link between women representation and company performance. The different
findings depend on the proxy used to measure firm performance (accounting vs market).
An interesting aspect of the study of women on the board is the concept of the “critical
mass.”Much research shows that female directors would be able to influence the work of the
board only when they are more than three (Torchia et al., 2011). In this vein, Joecks et al.
(2013), who explore the existence of critical mass quota on a sample of 151 listed German
firms for the years 2000–2005, confirm the need to appoint at least three women on the board
to improve firm performance. On the same wavelength, Rossi et al. (2017) investigate the
relationship between women on the board of directors, firm performance and corporate
decisions of 41 Italian listed companies and find the strong ability of women directors to
affect corporate decisions when they operate in a “critical mass” scenario. Also, Gyapong
et al. (2016) document a positive and significant effect of gender diversity on firm value of
245 South African listed firms and highlight that companies with three or more women
directors are associated with a greater firm value. Amore et al. (2014) analyze a large sample of
Italian family firms and show that the cooperation between the female owner and the women
directors is able to improve the quality of board advice and, as a consequence, corporate
performance. Based on the notion that women cooperate more with women than with men
(Greig and Bohnet, 2009), Xing et al. (2020) find that when a firm has women in a top
management position, its accounting profitability increases with the proportion of women on
the board of directors. However, the authors document a negative stock market reaction to the
appointment of female top managers in the presence of women on the board and a less positive
response when the appointed director also assumes the chief executive officer (CEO) position
(Kang et al., 2010).
It seems that large participation of females on the board of directors contributes to
enhance the firm operating profitability of female-led companies. Chadwick and Dawson
(2018) contribute to enlarge this stream of literature by distinguishing between financial and
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nonfinancial performance and comparing family and nonfamily businesses. From the
analysis of large public firms from the S&P 500, their findings show that organizations with
a female CEO and/or chief finance officer (CFO) outperform male-led companies in terms of
nonfinancial performance both if family and nonfamily businesses. More women in top
positions increase informational and social diversity benefits to the top management team
and motivate women in the other roles of the companies (Dezsö and Ross, 2012). The impact
of the women directors on firm performance may also depend on the size of the companies.
In fact, Shehata et al. (2017), who examine the link between board diversity and firm
performance in a large sample of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) located in the
UK, find a significant negative association between females and SMEs firm performance.
Differently, a study on listed nonfinancial firms in China (Li and Chen, 2018), which aims to
shed light on the moderating role of firm size on the gender diversity firm performance
relationship, demonstrates that women directors are capable to positively affect small
companies performance only.
One of the typical limitations of many research papers is that they are based on a single
country. By analyzing the relationship between women and performance in 35 countries, the
empirical research of Zhang (2020) shows that the relationship between women and firm
performance varies significantly across countries and underlines the importance of the
social context when considering gender diversity. Similarly, Comi et al. (2020) study the
effect of gender quotas on firm performance in three European countries, showing a
negative influence in France and an insignificant effect in Spain. Differently, board females
positively affect firm productivity of Italian companies. The authors clarify that the
different impact of female directors across the three countries may be related to the
heterogeneous differences in the law, in terms of presence of sanctions for noncomplainer
countries. On contrary, the recent work of Martín-Ugedo et al. (2018), based on a sample of
listed companies in Spain and Italy, reveals a positive impact of women in Spain and a
negative effect of females in Italy. The authors ascribe the conflicting results to the cultural
difference between the two contexts, such as their different masculine dimension.
Despite the presence of mixed results emerging from an analysis of the literature, both
the agency and resource dependence approaches predict several benefits for the companies
with a greater participation of females on the boards. Diversity boards are characterized by
an effective and efficient board of directors, which can help to avoid opportunistic behavior
from managers and to increase the company value. Although a large literature examining
the relationship between women on boards and firm financial performance, several
empirical and theoretical papers call further studies to clarify the role of female directors on
the boards and their capabilities in affecting firm performance.
2.3 Independent female directors and firm performance
The concept of independence finds its origin in the agency theory, whose supporters theorize that
the main task of independent directors is to supervise management activities to protect the
interests of shareholders and to mitigate potential agency conflicts that might impact negatively
on the value of thefirms.
Increasing the proportion of women directors in corporate boards can positively affect
the control role of boards because women directors are largely outside directors (Chen et al.,
2017; Daily et al., 1999). Many studies acknowledge a diversity board as more independent
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Terjesen et al., 2016). The presence of women on the board
should increase the profits of a company, both through a reduction in agency problems and
by a different ability to observe internal issues (Rubino et al., 2017). Several studies (Adams
and Funk, 2012; Carter et al., 2003; Rhode and Packel, 2014) observe a better ability to
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monitor the behavior of managers to act in the interest of shareholders on a heterogeneous
board. A diverse board, composed of subjects with varied cultural knowledge is the bearer
of many different points of view, which will contribute, among other things, to making
management more vigilant. Terjesen et al. (2016) show that an independent board has a
positive effect on corporate performance when there are female directors on the board.
Diversely, when there are no women, or there are few, the main effect is negative. Also, Kang
et al. (2010), who investigate a sample of Singaporean listed firms by using an event study,
experience a positive market reaction when companies announce the appointment of
independent women directors. Taking into consideration these assumptions, the presence of
women on the board should increase the profits of a company, reduce the agency problems
and improve the ability to control (Rubino et al., 2017). Thus, according to the agency theory
perspective, we expect that the presence of independent female directors can affect the
performance of the company positively. Thus, we hypothesize:
H1. Independent female directors are positively associated with firm performance.
2.4 Executive female directors and firm performance
Many studies show that women cover few executive positions on the boards (Cambrea et al.,
2019; Lückerath-Rovers, 2013; Smith et al., 2006). Ahern and Dittmar (2012) find that new
female directors have a greater probability of assuming nonexecutive positions than male
directors. As women directors have significantly less experience as CEOs, they are more
likely to be appointed as nonexecutive managers. However, the literature on gender
diversity suggests that executive women directors diversity can positively impact company
performance by fostering firm’s innovation (Bernile et al., 2018; Saggese et al., 2020) and
board’s capabilities to be more flexible (Harrison and Klein, 2007), dealing with ambiguity
(Ryan et al., 2007),and reducing the likelihood of excessive risk-taking in strategic decisions
(Faccio et al., 2016; Martín-Ugedo et al., 2018). A longitudinal research on the USA for the
period 1992–2004 states that it is not indifferent to choose the gender of the CEO. Indeed,
Vieito (2012) show that companies managed by a female CEO perform better than those
managed by a male CEO. Smith et al. (2006) show, despite the low percentage of executive
women members in top management positions, that executive women tend to have a
positive impact on company value. Also, Liu et al. (2014), comparing the effect of
independent and executive females on business performance, reveal the more significant
impact of women with executive power. The recent empirical research of Martín-Ugedo et al.
(2018), based on a sample of Spanish publishing firms, shows that the presence of a CEO
woman increases both the returns on assets and the returns on equity. Similarly, Strøm et al.
(2014) study a global sample of microfinance institutions in 73 countries and find that female
leadership, despite does not improve governance, leads to superior firm performance. Also,
Amore et al. (2014), who investigate a sample of family-controlled firms in Italy, show that
companies led by female CEOs perform better when at least 50% of board members are
women. Women directors are perceived as a precious resource for businesses, where they
are a source of unique skills and different points of view within the board, so they contribute
to improve the quality of decision-making. Hence, corporate boards elevate their competence
profile through the appointment of executive women directors (Kang et al., 2010), resulting
in better strategic decisions and firm performance (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Westphal,
1999). According to these arguments, we hypothesize as follows:




3.1 Sample and data
The hypotheses are tested on a sample of industrial firms listed on the Italian stock
exchange in Milan and included in Datastream for the period 2006–2015 (ten years). This
timeline allows for capturing the impact of the introduction of Law 120/2011 (Golfo–Mosca
law), which forces companies to observe a minimum percentage of female directors on the
boards. From the initial sample, we excluded banks and other financial institutions because
their budgets are influenced by exogenous factors. Besides, we do not consider companies
from the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), the sub-market of the Italian Stock
Exchange designed to help smaller companies to access the capital market, and companies
listed at Global Equity Market (GEM), the segment dedicated to the trading of shared of non-
Italian issuers already listed on other European Union financial markets. These procedures
have been adopted because companies listed on both AIM and GEM have not to comply
with the recommendations on gender quota and, thus, they could invalidate the analysis.
Finally, firms from which the data on corporate governance is not available were excluded.
The data on the presence of women on the board of directors were collected manually by
referring to the annual reports on corporate governance of the individual firms, available on
the official websites and the website of the Italian Stock Exchange. All financial variables’
data come fromThompson Reuters Datastream.
3.2 Variables
The dependent variable of the study is the ROA, which is an accounting measure of
business performance. It is computed as operating income before depreciation scaled by
total assets (Qiu and Wan, 2015). The main independent variables of the study are:
independent female directors and executive female directors, calculated as the percentages of
independent and executive women directors on the board, respectively. According to the
empirical literature that investigates the relationship between female directors and firm
performance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012), to check the firm-
specific effects, we used several control variables in the econometric model. Firm size is
measured as the natural logarithm of total revenues. Cash holdings is computed by the ratio
of cash and cash equivalents to the total assets. Leverage is calculated as total debt to total
assets. Cash flow is defined as cash flow divided by total assets. Sales growthwas a proxy to
identify the firm’s growth opportunities, measured as the sales of the company in year t
minus sales in year t–1, divided by sales in year t–1. Board size is the number of members
who sit on the board of directors. CEO duality is a dummy variable that takes a value equal
to one if the CEO is also the chairperson of the board, and zero otherwise. Independent
directors are identified by the ratio of independent directors on the board.
3.3 Empirical approach
To test our research hypotheses, we followed the empirical approach of previous studies on
gender diversity (Liu et al., 2014; Sila et al., 2016; Terjesen et al., 2016) and used the
generalized method of moments (GMM), which accounts for both dynamic endogeneity and
unobserved heterogeneity in panel data models. The GMM model offers more efficient and
consistent estimates for the coefficients as compared with other estimation techniques
(Ullah, Akhtar, and Zaefarian, 2018) and controls for the three significant sources of
endogeneity: unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity, dynamic endogeneity (Wintoki et al.,
2012). Considering that governance characteristics and firm performance can be
endogenously determined (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), GMM allows us to mitigate the
problem of the endogeneity of the variables related to the female directors by using lagged
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differences and lagged levels of dependent and independent variables as instruments
(Roodman, 2009). This technique involves the estimation of a system of two simultaneous
equations, one equation in levels and the other in first differences, estimated with lagged levels
and first differences instruments (Campbell and Vera, 2009). To test whether the GMM system
approach is valid, we calculate first- and second-order correlation tests (AR1 and AR2). The
Arellano-Bond test developed by Arellano and Bond, (1991) shows the lack of problems of
serial correlation of the second order. Consequently, the GMM estimation is valid. Thus, we can
confirm that our results are robust to controlling for endogeneity and reverse causality.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the main statistics for the sample of firms analyzed.
ROA, the dependent variable of the study, is about 0.01. Referring to the main
explanatory variables, the statistics show that female directors represent 12% of all the








ROA 0.014 0.121 –0.006 0.024 0.052
Female directors 0.121 0.119 0.000 0.111 0.214
Independent female 0.052 0.092 0.000 0.000 0.091
Executive female 0.030 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.000
Graduate female 0.100 0.112 0.000 0.077 0.182
Foreign female 0.007 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000
Busy female 0.028 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm size 13.122 1.863 11.818 12.817 14.269
Cash holdings 0.109 0.111 0.040 0.078 0.142
Leverage 0.312 0.197 0.173 0.300 0.420
Cash flow 0.045 0.095 0.018 0.050 0.083
Sales growth 0.633 16.367 –0.072 0.021 0.116
Board size 9.491 3.153 7.000 9.000 11.000
CEO duality 0.266 0.442 0.000 0.000 1.000








and 3% of directors, respectively. Regarding the characteristics of female directors, the data
shows that 10% of the members of the board of directors are women graduates. Busy female
directors, those with more than two other directorships, are almost 3% of the members.
Finally, only 0.007% of the board’s members are foreign women.
Figure 1 shows that although the percentage of women has grown increasingly over the
years, not all different types of directors have grown proportionally. Descriptive data show
that only the percentage of graduate and independent women follows the growing trend of
the total percentage of female directors. On the contrary, the proportion of foreign and
executive women has remained constant over the years.
Table 2 shows the correlations among all the independent variables. In general, problems
of correlations due to multicollinearity are negligible, as obtained from the correlation
matrix and variance inflation factor (VIF) test, not shown for reasons of brevity.
4. Empirical results and discussion
Table 3 shows the results of the analysis that examines the role of female directors in
determining firm performance.
In general, the estimated coefficients of the control variables are in line with the
indications from previous studies. Firm performance is positively correlated to cash
Table 2.
Correlation matrix
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 ROA 1
2 Female directors 0.0122 1
3 Independent female 0.0000979 0.651*** 1
4 Executive female 0.0165 0.430*** –0.106*** 1
5 Graduate female 0.0110 0.881*** 0.726*** 0.212*** 1
6 Foreign female –0.00336 0.272*** 0.277*** –0.00526 0.303*** 1
7 Firm size 0.140*** –0.121*** 0.0807** –0.221*** –0.0449 0.0624* 1
8 Cash holdings 0.0905*** 0.0203 0.00822 0.0834** 0.00780 –0.00731 –0.0304
9 Leverage –0.277*** 0.0132 0.0861** –0.159*** 0.0694** 0.0254 0.0778**
10 Cash flow 0.452*** –0.0802** –0.0569* –0.0551* –0.0879*** –0.0232 0.253***
11 Sales growth –0.0220 0.0261 0.00412 0.0325 0.0352 –0.00884 –0.0412
12 Board size 0.0476 –0.0509 0.0473 –0.163*** 0.00546 –0.0517 0.512***
13 CEO duality –0.0247 0.00358 –0.0674* 0.0424 –0.0440 –0.0398 –0.169***
14 Independent directors 0.0177 –0.00769 0.271*** –0.176*** 0.0903*** 0.0505 0.331***








8 Cash holdings 1
9 Leverage –0.214*** 1
10 Cash flow –0.0925*** –0.247*** 1
11 Sales growth 0.00262 –0.00568 –0.0465 1
12 Board size –0.0248 0.0133 0.115*** –0.0308 1
13 CEO duality 0.0608* –0.0379 –0.0455 0.0116 –0.211*** 1
14 Independent directors –0.102*** 0.172*** 0.0307 –0.0287 0.185*** –0.171*** 1
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate the statistical significance of each coefficient at a level of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01,
respectively
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holdings, cash flows and sales growth. Diversely, we find a negative relationship between
leverage and performance.
Looking at the table, the results inherent the generic proxy female directors show that the
coefficient of the female director is positive and statistically significant (b = 0.202, p< 0.01).
The empirical results show that increasing the percentage of female directors in the board
has a positive effect on firm performance.
The regressions in Column 2 permit the clarification of what is the predominant effect.
Concerning the hypotheses previously formulated, in Column 2 of Table 3, we have split the
continuous variable Female directors into two variables according to their roles on the board
of directors. This operation allows us to test whether the position fulfilled by the female
director might determine their impact on firm performance. By examining female directors
who are independent of the main shareholder, the econometric results show the statistical
significance of the independent female with a positive sign (b = 0.255, p < 0.01). Consistent
with the findings of previous studies, which investigate large samples of companies in two
developed countries like the USA and Italy (Chen et al., 2017; Rubino et al., 2017) and firms in
two developing countries as China and Turkey (Ararat et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2014), our
results show supporting evidence for the impact of gender diversity on corporate
performance through monitoring channels. Our findings are coherent with those of previous
studies (Rubino et al., 2017; Terjesen et al., 2016), which attribute the positive result to the
efficient monitoring of female directors on corporate management, determining a reduction
of opportunist behavior that can negatively impact on the company. The greater presence of
independent women seems associated with increased transparency and lower managerial
opportunism. Moreover, female independent directors are tough monitors and can increase
the board’s monitoring intensity. All these positive effects make independent female
directors as valuable members of the board, which lead to a reduction of agency costs and,







Female directors 0.202*** (0.003)
Independent female 0.255*** (0.000)
Executive female 0.297*** (0.000)
L.ROA –0.130** (0.012) –0.233*** (0.000)
Firm size 0.015 (0.287) 0.017 (0.174)
Cash holdings 0.143*** (0.000) 0.156*** (0.000)
Leverage –0.489*** (0.000) –0.479*** (0.000)
Cash flow 0.397*** (0.000) 0.359*** (0.000)
Sales growth 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000)
Board size –0.001 (0.424) 0.000 (0.705)
CEO duality –0.004 (0.589) 0.002 (0.721)
Independent directors –0.012 (0.420) –0.015 (0.284)
Constant –0.106 (0.575) –0.152 (0.372)
AR(1) p-value 0.0078 0.0058
AR(2) p-value 0.2792 0.3177
Year dummies Yes Yes
Observations 1,176 1,176
Number of ID 193 193




The findings shown in Column 2 of Table 3 confirm H2. The coefficient of the variable
executive female is positive and statistically significant (b = 0.297, p< 0.01). Consistent with
Smith et al. (2006), who show that the proportion of women in top management positions
tends to have positive effects on the performance of Danish companies, the results show that
the presence of female directors with executive power improves corporate performance. The
empirical results are also in line with Liu et al. (2014), who analyze a sample of listed
companies in China and show that female executive directors determine a stronger positive
effect on firm performance. Therefore, our evidence is coherent with studies conducted in
both developed and developing studies. The positive result can be explained by referring to
the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), which states that all members
of the board of directors, thanks to their specific characteristics, are able to improve the board,
supporting company management in making decisions. Specifically, the female directors with
an executive role, thanks to the different skills and abilities compared to those of male directors,
are able to impact positively on company performance. Our results are particularly interesting
because of the scarcity of studies examining the link between women executive and corporate
performance. Indeed, although it is noticed a general increase of the women’s presence on
boards, at the same time, it is widely recognized that women directors are mainly found to act
as nonexecutive directors (Willows and van der Linde, 2016). Consequently, the lower
percentage of women executives dissuades academic scholars from exploring such aspects of
gender diversity.
Our study integrated previous research by indicating that a diversity board, in terms of
the larger presence of women in both positions of independent and executive directors,
enhances the effectiveness of monitoring function of the board and the quality of advice and
counsel provided by the board of directors.
Despite the empirical results, Table 3 clearly shows the existence of a positive effect of
both independent and executive female directors on performance, the relationship between
gender diversity and performance could be dependent on some kind of personal specific
characteristics of the female directors, such as their education levels, their nationality and
the number of directorships held in other companies. All these factors might be able to
amplify rather than reduce the positive effect of female directors. To appreciate the
significance of these moderating factors, observing the ability to influence both the sign and
the intensity of the relationship is a way to understand the role played by different female
directors on the board. The controversial results reported in the literature on the direct link
between females and performance may also depend on the role of these moderating factors,
where interaction with female directors could drive themain effect on performance.
Table 4 shows the empirical evidence with regard to the relationship between female
directors and firm performance influenced by personal specific variables. In particular,
Columns 1–3 of Table 4 report the findings of the moderating role on the link between
independent female directors and performance, whereas Columns 4–6 show the results
related to the ability of the three proxies in moderating the link between executive female
directors and performance.
From an empirical point of view, to measure the moderating effect, we use three
interaction variables between our main independent variables (independent female directors
and executive female directors) and, alternatively, some variables related to the personal specific
characteristics of female directors. Specifically, to measure education, we use in the regressions a
variable named graduate, which identifies the percentage of women that have a degree from a
university. To test the impact of nationality, we consider a variable named foreign in the




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the number of directorships in other companies, we built a variable named busy, which identifies
the proportion of female directors that serves on two ormore boards.
The empirical results show that both the relationships between independent female
directors and executive female directors and corporate performance are significantly
influenced by some specific characteristics of female directors. Specifically, the econometric
results show that education moderates the link between independent and executive female
directors and performance in a different way. Diversely, those relationships are negatively
moderated by both the nationality of the female directors and their status as busy directors.
Concerning the moderating effect of the educational background, shown by the proxy
graduate, the coefficient of the interaction variable between Independent and Graduate variables
is negative and statistically significant (b = –0.675, p < . 01). The result shows that the
educational level negatively moderates the link between independent female and performance.
Surprisingly, the positive impact of independent female directors is lower when female directors
hold a university degree. It is plausible that graduate female directors have greater capabilities
compared to nongraduate female directors, especially on monitoring activities and in disciplining
management. Consequently, as suggested by Adams and Ferreira (2009), sometimes a gender-
diversified board, characterized by excessive monitoring of the CEO, can badly affect the
performance of the board, undermining the benefits thatwomen can bring.
On the contrary, the coefficient of the interaction variable between Executive and
Graduate variables is positive and statistically significant (b = 0.857, p< . 01). This finding
shows that the educational level positively impacts on the link between executive female
and performance. This positive effect is in line with the previous literature that highlights
how a good educational background in top executive teams leads to an appointee with the
most relevant expertise and skills to excel in the role (Adams et al., 2015; Erhardt et al., 2003).
Regarding the moderating role of the variables foreign and busy, the results seem to
highlight the negative consequences of having directors on the board of directors who may be
less present at board meetings or be heavily engaged in activities deriving from positions on
other boards. In both cases, the existing literature highlights the potential disadvantages of
assuming profiles with these characteristics on the board of directors. Several studies show
that foreign directors have a lower percentage of participation in company boards than national
directors (Hahn and Lasfer, 2016; Masulis et al., 2012), thus causing inefficiencies in the
functioning of the board and delays in the decision-making process. These weaknesses
negatively impact company performance. Similarly, the number of appointments also appears
to affect the functioning of the board negatively. Our results seem to confirm that busy female
directors are less effective due to the increased time commitment associated with multiple
board appointments. The findings are in line with empirical evidence that demonstrates that
directors with numerous board seats exhibit a higher tendency to be absent from board
meetings (Jiraporn et al., 2009). Furthermore, time constraints of busy directors potentially
cause them to be lower-quality monitors (Core et al., 1999) and less able to advise management
effectively (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006), which adversely affects firm performance.
5. Summary and conclusion
The paper investigated the effects of different types of female directors on firm performance
on a sample of listed companies in Italy. After analyzing the relationships between both
independent and executive female directors and firm performance, our research aimed to
test whether this link may be affected by other specific characteristics, such as the education
of female directors on the board, their nationality and the number of other positions they
hold in other boards of directors.
MEDAR
The empirical analyses, conducted on a sample of 193 listed companies during 2006–
2015, highlights a positive and significant relationship between both independent and
executive female directors and firm performance. However, after the consideration of some
moderating variables, related to personal and specific characteristics of the female directors,
the econometric findings show conflicting effects. Specifically, when both independent and
executive females are foreign directors and sit on more than other two boards of directors,
their presence seems to reduce performance. Differently, regarding the moderating role of
education, the econometric results indicate a controversial effect. In detail, when executive
female directors hold a university degree, the findings show the strongest positive impact on
performance. Diversely, the independent women who are graduates appear to reduce the
positive influence on firm performance.
Our findings are especially significant as they contribute to resolve both conceptual-
theoretical and empirical disputes about the impact of women directors on the performance
of companies. The recurrent empirical question is which of the two roles can female directors
perform the best? The findings indicate a need to discriminate among different “types” of
female directors. Overall, our analysis suggests that focusing solely on the role of the women
might obscure the true relationship between female directors and firm performance.
Corporate governance scholars should consider this aspect in addressing conceptual and
empirical controversies in the relationship between gender diversity and firm performance.
Based on our results, the contribution of this paper to the literature on corporate governance
is threefold. First, the paper enlarges the literature that examines the effect of board
diversity on company outcomes by analyzing how mixed peculiarities of women can
differently affect firm performance. Secondly, the research is the first evidence, to the best of
our knowledge, of the association between gender diversity and performance in the Italian
context based on a longitudinal study, which involves a period of ten years, allowing
consideration both of the years before and after the introduction of the gender quota law
(Golfo–Mosca law). Finally, our results suggest studying the issue of gender diversity
through a multi-theoretical approach. A single theory does not allow us to adequately
observe the role of the female in companies, thus reducing useful theoretical sources that
stimulate in-depth considerations on their real role in corporate governance.
Our paper is not without limitations. First, the evidence that emerged from the study
should be interpreted taking into consideration bias induced by the limited sample, which
includes only Italian listed companies. Consequently, the results do not allow a direct
comparison with other studies based on different contexts from the Italian one. Future
research could explore how the evolution of women on the board, in terms of other
qualitative characteristics, could affect both the board efficiency and firm value. Two main
aspects could be further explored. The first one is the field of the university degree. Our data
do not permit us to distinguish about the types of degree. However, it is plausible that a
director holding a degree in a business subject may be more comfortable in managing
companies’ activities instead of a board member who has a degree in economics, accounting,
legal and/or financial matters (Ruigrok et al., 2007). A second important aspect is related to
the status of the busy director. The increase in the minimum percentage of female directors
on the board, which grew from 20% in 2012 to 30% in 2015, did not lead to an increase in
female directors on the board, but resulted from the increase in positions for female directors
who already had positions on the board of directors (Liu et al., 2014). This consequence
could, on the one hand, negatively impact the functioning of the board, as demonstrated in
our empirical analyses, but at the same time, it could have benefits for companies deriving
from the greater experience of female directors. Considering that a further increase in the
minimum percentage up to 40% has been envisaged, a further increase in the positions of
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female directors is expected. Therefore, further studies could investigate how the role of
female directors is combined in the case of simultaneous multiple positions. Second, another
limitation of our work is that our research does not consider the different types of ownership
of the companies. From the investigation of other types of majority shareholders, such as
family, state, institutional investor (private equity fund and/or hedge fund) and foreign
ownership, may originate dissimilar findings. For instance, recent evidence shows that
family firms are primarily appointing family females as directors (Chadwick and Dawson,
2018). We believe it is essential to analyze the consequences on performance arising from the
nominating in the boards female directors belonging to the family owner from those external
to the family shareholders. Therefore, in future research, scholars could investigate this
critical aspect of the debate of women directors, which promises to highlight a differential
impact on firm outcomes depending both on the type of firm and whether women belong to
the family or not. Finally, we could not include any women’s professional features in our
research. Future studies can use some professional characteristics that could moderate the
link between female directors and firm performance. For instance, academic research could
explore the female directors’ international experience as one of the drivers of women’s
managerial capabilities.
Our findings have practical implications for policymakers and institutional actors who have
strongly supported gender diversity both in boards and top management teams. First, although
the law 120/2011 obliges companies to appoint women, the desire of the government was that the
different categories of female directors could grow in a uniform way, which did not happen. The
small number of women in executive positions, especially for the CEO role, hasmade it difficult to
analyze their effectiveness in the board of directors. Policymakers can use this research to
determine the issue of inequality and provide efficient instruments to correct existing disparities
between women and men in obtaining top corporate executive positions. Second, another
practical implication that originates from the results is that it is not enough to impose women’s
presence on corporate governance to have good management results. Hiring women directors,
both in independent and executive roles, is not a guarantee of better financial performance. Our
results suggest it is also fundamental to consider female directors’ specific features to be
appointed in the firm corporate governance systems, such as education, nationality and the
number of other directorships. For instance, we need to know whether employing as an
independent director a womanwho holdsmultiple appointments can ensure strongmonitoring of
themanagement or otherwise she becomes too busy tomonitormanagers adequately.
Note
1. For simplicity reasons, women directors and female directors are used interchangeably.
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